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Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that the constrained efﬁcient allocations of en-
dowment economies with imperfect risk sharing due to limited commitment can
be decentralized as competitive equilibria with endogenous debt constraints that
are not too tight. These are the loosest possible borrowing limits that do not al-
low for default in equilibrium. However, such a decentralization is not possible in
the presence of capital accumulation, since changes in the aggregate capital also
affect the incentives to default. In a model with endogenous production, aggre-
gate risk, and competitive intermediaries, we show that a decentralization with
endogenous debt constraints is possible if one also imposes an upper limit on the
intermediaries’ capital holdings.
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1. INTRODUCTION
During the recent years, models with limited commitment have been used to analyze
important economic issues. Among others, Thomas and Worrall (1988) study efﬁcient
wage contracts, Kocherlakota (1996) analyzes optimal risk sharing, and Alvarez and Jer-
mann (2001) study asset returns. Whereas the previous literature focuses mostly on
closed endowment economies, several papers have recently incorporated capital accu-
mulation into such a context (see e.g. Krueger and Perri (2006), who study the dynamics
of income and consumption inequality, or Wright (2001) and Bai and Zhang (2006), who
study international capital ﬂows). Limited commitment economies with both capital
accumulation and aggregate uncertainty have received less attention. One exception is
the work by Kehoe and Perri (2002b), which uses an open economy model with produc-
tion to analyze international risk sharing.
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In the present paper, we study the consequences of introducing endogenous pro-
duction into a closed economy framework with aggregate uncertainty and limited com-
mitment. In particular, we focus on the relationship between constrained efﬁcient al-
locations and competitive equilibria with endogenous borrowing limits by providing a
version of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics for this type of econ-
omy. Inourenvironment,limitedcommitmentarisesbecauseagentshavetheoptionto
default on their ﬁnancial liabilities every period. In particular, we assume that all their
assets are seized in the default period, after which they are excluded from future asset
trade (risk sharing) permanently. This implies that they have to rely solely on their labor
income, which depends on the aggregate capital stock and on aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic productivity. In other words, the outside option (autarky value) depends on both
the exogenous and endogenous states of the economy.
As shown by Alvarez and Jermann (2000), the constrained efﬁcient allocations of
exchange economies where full risk sharing is precluded due to limited commitment
can be decentralized as competitive equilibria with endogenously incomplete markets
where the borrowing constraints are “not too tight.” These are the loosest possible bor-
rowing limits that do not allow for default in equilibrium. We ﬁrst show that this decen-
tralization is not possible if one introduces capital accumulation and aggregate uncer-
taintyintosuchaframework. Thereasonisthat,inthepresenceofbindingenforcement
constraints, higher capital accumulation has two additional effects on the Euler condi-
tion that determines aggregate investment. On the one hand, it increases consumption
and output next period, decreasing the incentives to default and raising therefore the
beneﬁtsofhigheraggregatecapital. Ontheotherhand,ittightenstheenforcementcon-
straints through an increase in the outside option (autarky effect), reducing the beneﬁts
of more capital. Since the previous two effects drive a wedge between the marginal rates
of substitution and transformation, the optimal allocations cannot be decentralized as
competitive equilibria, even in the presence of endogenous debt constraints.
This result has been shown also by Kehoe and Perri (2002a, 2004) for a two-sector
model where the agents are interpreted as countries. In addition, these authors argue
that the constrained efﬁcient allocations can be decentralized with either capital taxes
and government default on foreign loans or with endogenous debt and capital accu-
mulation constraints. However, they focus on the ﬁrst decentralization and only brieﬂy
discuss the latter. In contrast, we study a decentralization with debt constraints, since
our agents cannot be interpreted as countries and sovereign default therefore makes
no sense. Moreover, one of our key extensions is the introduction of competitive ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries that operate the investment technology. We ﬁrst show that by
introducing intermediaries we can eliminate one of the two distortions of limited com-
mitment on capital accumulation. In addition, we show that the optimal allocations
can be decentralized with endogenous debt constraints and with capital accumulation
constraints on the capital holdings of the intermediaries.
Ourﬁndingscontributetoagrowingliteraturethatstudiesmodelswithlimitedcom-
mitment and capital accumulation. They provide the basic insight regarding why the
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efﬁcient allocations in an environment with endogenous portfolio constraints and lim-
ited commitment. In contrast to the model of Kehoe and Perri (2004), who study an
open economy where the agents (countries) can keep their stock of capital after default,
our model has a very different closed economy setup where the agents’ labor income af-
ter default depends on the capital stock even though an agent who defaults is excluded
from the future ownership of capital. Hence the economic environment in this paper is
critically different from previous models in the way that aggregate capital inﬂuences the
value of default.
We believe that our framework has many potential applications, such as the study of
wealth and consumption inequality and the welfare impact of government policies. In
particular, our decentralization result indicates that, in these environments, optimal-
ity requires not only that borrowing constraints are individual speciﬁc, but also that
the aggregate capital stock adjusts in order to balance the default incentives. As shown
by Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2006), who study the present setup numerically, the
generalequilibriumcapitalaccumulationeffectsthatwehaveidentiﬁedmayplayavery
important role in these applications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model economy. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the competitive equilibrium with endogenous borrowing limits and ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries that may be subject to capital accumulation constraints. Sec-
tion 4 characterizes the constrained efﬁcient allocations of the benchmark economy
and Section 5 shows that decentralization as a competitive equilibrium with endoge-
nous borrowing limits is possible only in the presence of accumulation constraints on
thecapitalholdingsoftheintermediaries. Finally, Section6summarizesandconcludes.
2. THE ECONOMY
We consider an inﬁnite-horizon economy with aggregate uncertainty, idiosyncratic risk,
endogenousproduction,andparticipationconstraints.1 Timeisdiscreteandindexedby
t = 0,1,2,.... The resolution of uncertainty is represented by an information structure
or event-tree N. Each node st ∈ N, summarizing the history until date t, has a ﬁnite
numberofimmediatesuccessors,denotedbyst+1|st. Weusethenotationsr|st withr ≥
t to indicate that node sr belongs to the sub-tree with root st. With the exception of the
unique root node s0 at t = 0, each node st has a unique predecessor, denoted by st−1.
The probability of st as of period 0 is denoted by π(st), with π(s0) = 1. The conditional
probability of sr given st is represented by π(sr|st). For notational convenience, for any
variable x we use {x}={x(st)}st ∈N to denote the entire state-contingent sequence.
Ateachnodest,thereexistsaspotmarketforasingleconsumptiongoody(st)∈R+,
which is produced with the following aggregate technology:
y(st)= f (z(st),K(st−1),L(st)).
Here K(st−1) ∈ R+ and L(st) ∈ R+ denote the aggregate capital and labor respec-
tively, with K(s−1) ∈ R++ given, and z(st) ∈ R++ is a productivity shock that follows
1Our model extends the economies in Kocherlakota (1996) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) to a context
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a stationary Markov chain with Nz possible values. Given z, the production function
f (z,·,·) : R2
+ → R+ is assumed to be continuously differentiable on the interior of its do-
main, strictly increasing, strictly concave in K, and homogeneous of degree one in the
two arguments. Moreover, we assume that fLK(z,K,L) > 0, limK→0 fK(z,K,L) = ∞, and
limk→∞ fK(z,K,L) = 0 for all K > 0 and L > 0. Capital depreciates at a constant rate δ
and we deﬁne F(st)=y(st)+(1−δ)K(st−1).
Theeconomyispopulatedbytwotypesofhouseholdsthatareindexedbyi ∈{1,2}≡
I, with a continuum of identical consumers within each type.2 Households have addi-










where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor and E0 denotes the expectation condi-
tional on information at date t = 0. The period utility function u is strictly increasing,
strictlyconcave,unboundedbelow,andcontinuouslydifferentiable,withlimc→0u 0(c)=
∞ and limc→∞u 0(c)=0.
At each date-state st, households receive a stochastic labor endowment "i(st) that
follows a stationary Markov chain with N" possible values. Households supply labor in-
elastically, implying that L(st) =
P
i∈I "i(st). They have a potentially history dependent





βr−tπ(sr)u(ci(sr))≥Vi(st) ∀i ∈ I and ∀st.





This section deﬁnes a competitive equilibrium with endogenous borrowing limits and a
competitive intermediation sector for the framework described in Section 2. To do this,
we assume that the economy is populated by a representative ﬁrm that operates the
production technology and by a risk neutral and competitive ﬁnancial intermediation
sectorthatoperatestheinvestmenttechnology. Sinceweconsideronlysymmetricequi-
libria where all intermediaries hold the same portfolio, we focus on the representative
intermediary.
In each period t, after observing the realization of the productivity shock, the repre-
sentative ﬁrm rents labor from the households and physical capital from the intermedi-




2All the results in the paper hold for any arbitrary ﬁnite number of types, and the assumption of two
types is therefore without loss of generality. We adopt the assumption because it simpliﬁes both the nota-
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Proﬁt maximization implies that factor prices are given by
w(st)= fL(st)≡ fL(z(st),K(st−1),L(st)) ∀st (1)
and
r(st)= fK(st)≡ fK(z(st),K(st−1),L(st)) ∀st. (2)
Therepresentativeintermediarylivesfortwoperiods. Anintermediarybornatnode
st ﬁrst decides how much capital k(st) to purchase subject to the capital accumulation
constraint k(st) ≤ B(st). This (potentially binding) constraint plays a central role when
we decentralize the constrained efﬁcient allocations. The capital is rented to the ﬁrm,
earning a rental revenue of r(st+1)k(st) and a liquidation value of (1−δ)k(st) the fol-
lowing period. To ﬁnance the capital purchases, the intermediary sells the future con-
sumption goods in the spot market for one period ahead contingent claims, which are









s.t. k(st)≤ B(st). (3)






Here, it is important to note that 1 ≤
P
st+1|st q(st+1|st)[r(st+1)+(1−δ)] due to the
fact that ψ(st) ≥ 0. In other words, if the savings constraint is not binding (ψ(st) = 0),






We assume that proﬁts are distributed to the households when they are realized, i.e.
during the ﬁrst period of the intermediary’s life-cycle. The period before an intermedi-
arystartsitsbusiness,householdsownθ0
i (st−1)sharesofit,whichtheycanimmediately
trade at the price p(st). This price represents the value of an intermediary that will pay
dividends next period. At each st, households can also trade in a complete set of state
contingent claims to one-period-ahead consumption. The budget constraint of house-





In this inequality, ci(st)=ci(st)−p(st)θ0
i (st−1)−w(st)"i(st) represents the individ-
ual consumption net of the value of initial shares in the intermediaries and of labor in-
come. In addition, ai(st+1) and θi(st) represent the amounts of state contingent claims
and shares in the intermediary held by i ∈ I at the end of period t.444 Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Market clearing for the state contingent securities requires that the debt issued
by the intermediaries matches the demand of the households, that is,
P
i ai(st+1) =
[r(st+1) + (1 − δ)]K(st). Further, θ0
i (st−1) is given for i = 1,2, while
P
i θi(st) = P
i θ0
i (st−1)=1. If we denote by ωi(st)≡d(st)θi(st−1)+ai(st) the initial asset wealth of








st+1|st q(st+1|st)ωi(st+1)≤ωi(st) and ωi(st+1)≥Ai(st+1).
(6)
As reﬂected by the second inequality in (6), the individual asset wealth is subject
to a borrowing constraint of Ai(st+1). The equilibrium determination of these limits is
discussed later. If γi(st+1)≥0 is the multiplier on this constraint, the necessary and suf-
ﬁcient ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ai(st+1) and θi(st) from the maximization






























This equation can also be obtained using no arbitrage arguments. It allows us to
rewrite the agent’s problem as if the decision variable were the next period wealth
ωi(st+1) instead of ai(st+1) and θi(st) separately. We use this result below in our def-
inition of a competitive equilibrium. This result implies also that there is a continuum
of possible combinations of ai(st+1) and θi(st) that yield the same allocations, since
the share in the intermediaries is a “redundant” asset in spite of markets being endoge-







cumulation constraints {B}, and initial conditions K(s−1) and {ωi(s0)}i∈I is a vector
of quantities {(ci,ωi)i∈I,k,K,d} and prices {w,r,q} such that (i) given prices, {ci,ωi}
solves the problem in (6) for each household i ∈ I; (ii) the factor prices {w,r} satisfy
the optimality conditions of the ﬁrm in (1) and (2); (iii) q, r, and d satisfy the optimal-
ity conditions of the intermediary in (4) and (5); and (iv) all markets clear, i.e., for all




i "i(st)= L(st), and P
i∈I ci(st)+K(st)= F(st).Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Enforcement constraints and intermediation 445
As stated in Section 2, each household i has an outside option of Vi(st). In the
present setting, we assume that households can leave the risk sharing arrangement at
any date-state to go to ﬁnancial autarky. In this case, they are able only to consume
their labor income, while they are excluded from ﬁnancial markets forever.3 Given this,
we choose limits that are not too tight in the sense that looser limits would imply that
an agent with that level of debt prefers to leave the trading arrangement. To deter-
mine these limits, we deﬁne the value of the trading arrangement recursively. The state
vector of household i ∈ I is represented by Si(st) = ({"i(st)}i∈I,z(st),K(st−1)), where
({"i(st)}i∈I,z(st)) is the vector of exogenous states and K(st−1) is an endogenous state
that is determined in equilibrium. Using this notation, the value of the trading arrange-





DEFINITION 2. The borrowing constraints {Ai}i∈I are not too tight if they satisfy the fol-
lowing condition for all i ∈ I and all nodes st ∈N:
W ce(Ai(st),Si(st))=V ce(Si(st)), (9)







It is important to note that the value of staying in the trading arrangement W ce is
strictly increasing in wealth, whereas the autarky value V ce is not a function of ωi(st).
This implies that the limits deﬁned by (9) exist and are unique under our assumptions
on the utility function. Moreover, since W ce(0,Si(st))≥V ce(Si(st)) and W ce is increasing
in ωi, equation (9) implies that Ai(st) ≤ 0. Intuitively, no agent would default with a
positive level of wealth, since he could then afford a higher current consumption than
inautarkyandwouldhaveatleastashighalifetimeutilityasinautarkyfromnextperiod
on.
Finally, it should be pointed out that all the results in the paper hold for an alter-
native setting where the intermediaries maximize their market values but are inﬁnitely
lived. In this case, each intermediary decides how much capital k(st) to purchase at
each node subject to the capital accumulation constraint in (3). The capital is rented
to the ﬁrm and is ﬁnanced by selling the next period consumption goods in the spot
market for one-period-ahead contingent claims. If we let
Q(st+j|st)=q(st+j|st+j−1)q(st+j−1|st+j−1)···q(st+1|st)
3One could consider a different outside option where households are excluded from trade in Arrow se-
curities but can still save by accumulating physical capital. This would not affect our results qualitatively.446 Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)














we can assume that proﬁts are distributed to the households every period according to
theirbeginning-of-periodownershipshares θi(st−1), where θi(s−1) ifgivenfor i =1,2. If
we let ωi(st)≡[d(st)+p(st)]θi(st−1)+ai(st) and ci(st)=ci(st)−w(st)"i(st), the price










While this alternative setting might be more appealing, since it requires only set-
ting θi(s−1), it might lead to the typical shareholder disagreement problem under in-
complete markets.4 In other words, when the borrowing constraints are binding, differ-
ent household types typically value future output differently due to the fact that their
marginal rates of substitution are not equalized. Note that this is not an issue if the in-
termediary lives for two periods, in which case a household who holds the majority of
shares at st will agree to use q(st+1|st) as a discount factor. However, a currently un-
constrained agent may prefer a different discount factor if the intermediary is inﬁnitely
lived, since she may get constrained in some future contingency. Given this, we chose
to work with the two period formulation.
4. CONSTRAINED EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
This section characterizes the constrained efﬁcient allocations of the economy in Sec-
tion 2. As usual, the optimal allocations solve a central planning problem where the
planner takes into account both the resource constraint and the participation con-
straints of the two households. If αi is the initial Pareto weight assigned by the planner
4For a good review of this literature see Grossmann and Stiglitz (1977, 1980) or Drèze (1985). See also
DufﬁeandShafer(1986)foradetailedanalysisofthevaluemaximizationobjectiveinamultiperiodcontext
and Cárceles-Poveda and Coen-Pirani (2005, 2006) for a more formal discussion of this issue in a model
where markets are exogenously incomplete.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Enforcement constraints and intermediation 447


















βr−tπ(sr)u(ci(sr))≥V(Si(st)) ∀i ∈ I and ∀st. (11)
Note that we have set Vi(st) = V(Si(st)) by assuming that the outside option value for
i ∈ I depends onSi(st)=({"i(st)}i∈I,z(st),K(st−1)).
In the literature, a standard approach to write this problem recursively is to use the
agent’s lifetime utility as a state variable (see e.g. Atkeson and Lucas 1995, Thomas and
Worrall 1988, and Kocherlakota 1996). To do this, we let ϕ(st)=({"i(st)}i∈I,z(st)) be the
vector of exogenous shocks, h(st) = {hi(st)}i∈I be the vector of lifetime utilities at st,
and h(st+1|st) = {hi(st+1|st)}i∈I be the vector of next period promised lifetime utilities
if date-event st+1 occurs. Using this notation, the recursive formulation of the problem























objective is to minimize the cost (or maximize the surplus) of delivering certain lifetime
utilities h(st) to the households.5 The constraints in (13) represent the participation
constraints, while those in (14) make sure that the lifetime utility promises are honored
at every date-state st. Finally, condition (15) guarantees that the planner cannot store
goods between periods. It is important to note that we need to set h(s0) in such a way
that J(h(s0),ϕ(s0),K(s−1))=0 to get a solution on the (constrained) Pareto frontier. The
lifetime utilities hi(s0) and h−i(s0) correspond to the Pareto weights αi and α−i in the
sequential problem.
5Alternatively, wecanusetherecursivesaddlepointmethodofMarcetandMarimon(1998), asinKehoe
and Perri (2002a, 2004). In this case, we obtain the same ﬁrst-order conditions.448 Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Severalpointsareworthnoting. First, intheabsenceoftheparticipationconstraints
in (13), this is a standard convex optimization problem, since we have a concave objec-
tive function and a convex set of constraints. However, in the more interesting case
where the participation constraints are (occasionally) binding, convexity is not always
guaranteed. In particular, a sufﬁcient (but not necessary) condition for convexity is that
the autarky value V is a convex function of the aggregate capital. Since we assume that






As we see, the convexity of V with respect to the aggregate capital stock depends on
thecurvatureoftheperiodutilityu,ontheconvexityofthemarginalproductoflabor fL
with respect to capital, and on the optimal law of motion of capital K 0({"i(st)}i∈I,K,z).
Sincethelatterisanendogenousobject,however,itispracticallyimpossibletoestablish
analytical conditions under which V is convex in K.
Inaddition,theauthorsofafewmodelswithcapitalaccumulationandlimitedcom-
mitment have derived sufﬁcient conditions for the convexity of similar problems. How-
ever,thesemodelsaresimplerinseveralimportantdimensionsandwethereforecannot
apply their results. First, Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) derive sufﬁcient condi-
tions when both parties are risk neutral. In this case, it is easy to see that our problem
is convex. Second, Sigouin (2003) studies a model where the borrower is risk averse, but
where his payoff after default does not depend on the capital stock. Under this assump-
tion also, it can be shown that the ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and sufﬁcient.
In particular, this is the case with a linear technology, since the marginal product of la-
bor does not depend on the aggregate capital. Unfortunately, neither linear utility nor
linear technology are appealing in our framework. Finally, Thomas and Worrall (1994)
providesufﬁcientconditionsforacasewheretheborrowerisriskaverseandtheoutside
option depends on the aggregate capital. However, capital inﬂuences only the value of
autarky in the period of default, while the autarky value in our case depends also on the
future levels of capital (through the future wages). Thus, the condition they derive is not
applicable to our setup either.
The previous discussion illustrates that it is hard to derive sufﬁcient conditions un-
der which the constraint set is convex in the present framework. Given this, we use the
following conjecture throughout the text.
CONJECTURE 1. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the component planner’s problem with V
given by (16) are not only necessary but also sufﬁcient.
We think that this conjecture is not problematic for two reasons. First, one can al-
ways introduce lotteries to convexify the constraint set (see e.g. Ligon et al. 2000), in
which case the value function is concave. While the key ﬁrst-order conditions that we
use to derive our main results are essentially the same with randomization, the nota-
tion is considerably more complicated. Second, Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2006)Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Enforcement constraints and intermediation 449
numerically solve different parameterizations of the problem of ﬁnding the constrained
efﬁcient allocations with a version of a policy iteration algorithm that imposes all the
necessary ﬁrst-order conditions, including the participation constraints and the Kuhn–
Tucker slackness conditions. In all the cases considered, the authors ﬁnd a unique con-
strained efﬁcient allocation regardless of the initial guess. Since the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions of this problem are necessary, this indicates that (at least for the assumed func-
tional forms and for a wide range of parameter values), the ﬁrst-order conditions are
also sufﬁcient.
Inwhatfollows,weletµi(st)≥0andβπ(st+1|st)γi(st+1|st)≥0betheLagrangemul-
tipliers of the constraints in (14) and (13) respectively. Under the assumption that the
ﬁrst-order conditions are sufﬁcient, it is easy to see that the optimal allocations of this
problem can be characterized by the resource constraint, the participation constraints





























The terms FK(st) = fK(st) + 1 − δ and {VK(Si(st+1))}i∈I on the right-hand side of
(18) represent the derivatives of total output F and of the outside option value V with
respect to the aggregate capital stock K. We have expressed the ﬁrst-order conditions in
terms of the normalized multipliers λ and vi, which simplify the system of equilibrium










Several points are worth noting. First, since µi(s0) > 0 due to the fact that the ini-
tial constraint in (14) is always binding at the optimum, it follows that vi(st) > 0 only if
γi(st) > 0 for all st. This implies that vi(st) is positive only when the participation con-
straint of type i ∈ I is binding. Second, λ represents the time varying Pareto weight of
type 2 households relative to type 1 households. Thus, as usual in models with endoge-
nouslyincompletemarkets, condition(17)impliesthattherelativeconsumptionsofthe
6We assume that J(h(s0),ϕ(s0),K(s−1)) = 0, implying that the constraint (15) has to be satisﬁed with
equality at all date-states, and that we can replace it by (10). Moreover the deﬁnition of h obviously implies
that (13) is equivalent to (11).450 Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
twotypesaredeterminedbytheirtimevaryingrelativeParetoweights. Third,asinother
modelswithoutcommitment(seee.g.ThomasandWorrall1988andKocherlakota1996)
whenever households of type 1 have a binding participation constraint (v1(st) > 0), λ
decreases, and their relative Pareto weight therefore increases. The opposite happens
when the participation constraint of type 2 household is binding. Finally, since the ag-
gregate technology and the idiosyncratic income shocks are Markovian, the optimal al-
location of this problem is recursive in ({"i(st)}i∈I,z,K,λ), where ({"i(st)}i∈I,z) is the
vector of exogenous states and (K,λ) are endogenous states that are determined at the
optimum.
When the participation constraints are not binding for any household at any con-
tinuation history st+1|st, implying that vi(st+1) = 0 for i = 1,2, the Euler equation (18)
reduces to the standard capital Euler condition of the stochastic growth model. The
presence of binding enforcement constraints at st+1 introduces two additional effects
on the intertemporal allocation of consumption and capital.
First, it increases the planner’s marginal rate of substitution between period t and
t +1goods,raisingthebeneﬁtsofhigheraggregatecapitalatt +1,sincethisincreasesfu-
tureconsumptionanddecreasesthedefaultincentives. Thisisreﬂectedbythepresence
of vi(st+1) in the ﬁrst part of the right-hand side of the equation. Second, it tightens the
enforcement constraints through an increase in the autarky value, reducing the beneﬁts
of more capital at t +1. This is reﬂected by the autarky effects in the second part of the
right-hand side of the equation.
The following property proves to be useful later on. If {ci(st)}i∈I is constrained efﬁ-









stitution in the constrained efﬁcient equilibrium. Note that this can be easily checked if





















In what follows, we focus on allocations that have high implied interest rates, in the
sense that their present value is ﬁnite when discounted with the appropriate present



















5. DECENTRALIZATION WITH CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CONSTRAINTS
This section shows that decentralization of the constrained efﬁcient allocations with
debt constraints is possible only if one imposes the savings constraint on the capi-
tal holdings of the intermediary. In a related two-country model, Kehoe and Perri
(2004) show that decentralization is possible with government default on foreign loans
and with capital income taxes. In our closed economy framework, it is less appealing
to model governments defaulting on behalf of some of the households against other
householdsinthesameeconomy. Giventhis,wefocusondecentralizationwithborrow-
ing constraints. As we show below, such decentralization requires that we also impose
capital accumulation constraints on the capital holdings of the intermediaries.8
We start by showing that constrained efﬁcient allocations with an outside option of
ﬁnancial autarky cannot be decentralized as competitive equilibria in the presence of
binding capital accumulation constraints.
PROPOSITION 1. Let ({ci(st)}i∈I,K) be a constrained efﬁcient allocation where VK 6= 0.
Thisallocationcannotbedecentralizedasacompetitiveequilibriumwithonlyborrowing
constraints that are not too tight unless the participation constraints in the constrained
efﬁcient allocation never bind.
PROOF. To prove the proposition, we can use equation (19) to rewrite the Euler condi-


























8These capital accumulation constraints can also be reinterpreted as the equilibrium consequence of
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Since the portfolio constraint (23) can be binding only for one of the two households, it
follows that γi(st+1) = 0 for at least one household. Given this, equations (4) and (7) of



















where we have substituted for r(st+1) from (2). Clearly, the two equilibrium conditions
(22) and (24) cannot be satisﬁed by the same allocation ({ci(st)}i∈I,K) if the participa-
tion constraint is ever binding, that is, if vi(st+1) > 0 for some i ∈ I and some st+1|st
with π(st+1|st) > 0. Thus, the constrained efﬁcient allocations cannot be decentralized
as competitive equilibria with borrowing constraints that are not too tight. 
Several points are worth noting. First, this result is in contrast to the one obtained
by Alvarez and Jermann (2000), who show that decentralization of the constrained ef-
ﬁcient allocations with borrowing constraints that are not too tight is possible in the
absence of capital accumulation. Second, a similar result has been shown by Kehoe
and Perri (2002a) for a two-country economy with no ﬁnancial intermediaries.9 While
there are important differences between our setup and theirs, most of our results apply
to their framework with minor modiﬁcations if we introduce competitive ﬁnancial in-
termediaries that operate the production technologies in both countries. This is further
discussed in Section 5.1, where our setup is compared extensively to the two-country
framework studied by the previous authors.
In what follows, we show that the constrained efﬁcient allocations can be decentral-
ized with borrowing constraints on the Arrow securities that are not too tight if one also
imposes a savings constraint on the capital holdings of the intermediary. This is stated
in the following proposition, which is the second fundamental theorem of welfare eco-
nomics for our environment. The proof of this result is relegated to the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 2. Let ({ci(st)}i∈I,K) be a constrained efﬁcient allocation where c(st) = P
i ci(st) has high implied interest rates. Further, assume that the intermediary in the
decentralized economy is subject to endogenously determined capital accumulation con-
straints of the form k(st) ≤ B(st). Then, the constrained efﬁcient allocations can be de-
centralized as competitive equilibria with borrowing constraints that are not too tight.
The proof of this proposition extends the ones in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and
Kehoe and Perri (2002a), where the authors focus on exchange economies, to the pres-
enceofproductionandﬁnancialintermediariesthataresubjecttocapitalaccumulation
constraints.
First, we show that {B} can be set so that a constrained efﬁcient allocation that sat-
isﬁes the planner’s capital Euler equation (18) also satisﬁes the optimality condition of
9See also Seppälä (1999) for a similar argument in a related two-sector model.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Enforcement constraints and intermediation 453
theintermediary(4)inthecompetitiveequilibrium. Second, theallocationsoftheplan-
ner’sproblemcanbeusedtoconstructthedividendsd andsharepricesp, aswellasthe
factor prices (r,w) and the Arrow security pricesq, that satisfy the optimality conditions
of the ﬁrms and the households. Further, we can iterate on the budget constraints in
the competitive equilibrium to obtain the wealth levels {ωi}i∈I that support the optimal
allocations at every node. In particular, by varying αi for i ∈ I, we can recover any possi-
bleinitialwealthdistribution. Itistheneasytoseethattheconstructedallocationsclear
the markets and satisfy the transversality condition.
In addition, we ﬁrst set the borrowing limits {Ai}i∈I equal to {ωi}i∈I whenever the
participation constraints in the planner’s problem are binding and to the natural bor-
rowing limit otherwise. Finally, we can construct the value functions in the competitive
equilibrium from the value functions of the planner’s problem and redeﬁne the borrow-
ing limits so that they are not too tight for the cases where the participation constraint
in the planner’s problem is not binding. This way, the constructed allocations with the
new borrowing limits are still feasible and optimal.
5.1 A two-sector model
In this section we discuss how our previous ﬁndings apply to the two-country frame-
work with no ﬁnancial intermediaries studied by Kehoe and Perri (2002a).
Consider a two-country (sector) framework with no ﬁnancial intermediaries. In
such a framework, each country consists of a large number of identical agents with a
production technology that is subject to a country speciﬁc shock {zi}. Let Fi(st) ≡
f (zi(st),ki(st−1),li(st))+(1−δ)ki(st−1)denotetheproductionofcountryi ∈ I including

























βr−tπ(sr)u(ci(sr))≥V(Si(st)) ∀i and ∀st.
As in our model, optimality requires that equation (17) be satisﬁed. In addition, it is

















Note that unlike in our setup with only one sector, this condition is not the same
for the two agents due to the fact that Fi
k(st+1) differs between them. Consider now a
decentralization of the constrained efﬁcient allocations as competitive equilibria with
endogenous debt limits but no capital accumulation constraints and no ﬁnancial inter-













ki(st)≥0 and ai(st+1)≥Ai(st+1) ∀i and ∀st.




















∀i and ∀st. (26)
As pointed out by Kehoe and Perri (2002a), it is easy to see that equations (25) and
(26) cannot be satisﬁed by the same allocation. Given this, the authors conclude that
theconstrainedefﬁcientallocationsintheirframeworkcannotbedecentralizedascom-
petitive equilibria with endogenous borrowing constraints. In their case the decentral-
ization becomes impossible for two reasons. First, the marginal rates of intertemporal
substitution are not aligned between equations (25) and (26). Second, there are autarky
effects in (25). In contrast, only the latter effect is present in our framework. The key
reason is the absence of ﬁnancial intermediaries. To see this, suppose that we intro-
duceﬁnancialintermediariesthatoperatetheproductiontechnologyandthatpurchase
capital by issuing Arrow securities in the international market. In this case, the budget

















It is easy to see that, in the presence of intermediaries, the impossibility of decen-
tralization with borrowing constraints is due only to the autarky effects. While the de-
centralization with capital accumulation constraints described by Proposition 2 is also
possible, the authors study instead a context with no ﬁnancial intermediaries and they
focus on decentralization with governmental default and capital income taxation.
10Note that the nonnegativity restriction on capital holdings is not binding in equilibrium.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Enforcement constraints and intermediation 455
6. CONCLUSIONS
The present paper shows that, in contrast to the ﬁndings in exchange economies, the
constrained efﬁcient allocations of a model with limited commitment and capital accu-
mulation cannot be decentralized as competitive equilibria with borrowing constraints
that are not too tight. Our key result is that, with the introduction of ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries, this decentralization becomes possible by imposing an upper limit on the
intermediary’s capital holdings. Moreover, we show that this result can be applied also
to a framework with two sectors, which has been studied in the literature.
Our decentralization results can be used to analyze several applied questions where
capital accumulation, aggregate uncertainty, and limited commitment are all relevant.
As an example, one could study consumption and wealth inequality along the growth
path, where capital accumulation can play an important role in determining the incen-
tivestodefault. Notethatinsuchanenvironment,ourresultssuggestthatthereisaneg-
ative relationship between the extent of risk sharing and the accumulation of aggregate
capital. Ceterisparibus,thehigheristhecapitalgrowth,thehigheraretheincentivesfor
defaultandthetighteraretheendogenousborrowingconstraints. Theoptimallychosen
capital accumulation constraints thus have to balance this adverse effect with the usual




PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. To prove the proposition, we ﬁrst note that the capital ac-
cumulation constraint B(st) can be set so that a constrained efﬁcient allocation that
satisﬁes the planner’s capital Euler equation (22) also satisﬁes the optimality condition
(4) of the intermediary. In particular, when the enforcement constraint in the planner’s
problem does not bind for any household at period t +1, implying that vi(st+1) = 0 for
i = 1,2 and all st+1|st, B(st) is set to an arbitrary large number so that B(st) > K(st),
where K(st) is capital stock in the planner’s problem. In this case, ψ(st) = 0. When the
enforcement constraint in the planner’s problem is binding for either of the two house-
holds, B(st) is set to the level of capital that solves the optimal allocation. In this case,














Note that VK(Si(st+1)) ≥ 0 for i = 1,2 due to our assumptions on the production func-
tion, which imply that the marginal product of labor is increasing in capital. Given this,
vi(st+1)≥0, and u 0(ci(st))≥0, it follows that ψ(st)≥0.
The factor prices w(st) and r(st) that satisfy the optimality conditions of the ﬁrm
in the competitive equilibrium can be constructed from the capital allocation of the456 Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
planner’s problem using equations (1) and (2). Further, the consumption allocations
from the planner’s problem and equations (20) and (21) can be used to deﬁne the prices
q(st+1|st)=qp(st+1|st) andQ(st+1|st)=Qp(st+1|st). In addition,q(st+1|st) can be used
to deﬁne the multiplier γi(st+1) so that the asset Euler condition of the agents in equa-
tion (7) is satisﬁed. It is easy to check that the multiplier has the desired properties.
In particular, if vi(st+1) = 0, then γi(st+1) = 0. Further, if vi(st+1) > 0, it follows that

























Since the high implied interest rate condition holds, we can then use the budget
constraint of the households in the competitive equilibrium to construct the wealth lev-
els ωi(st) that support the constrained efﬁcient consumption allocations at every node.
To do this, we ﬁrst construct the proﬁts d(st) from (5), the share price p(st) from (8),
and the individual labor incomes from wi(st) = w(st)"i(st). We iterate on the budget














Note that we can choose the initial Pareto weights αi for i = 1,2 so that we exactly
recover the initial wealth levels in the competitive equilibrium. Concerning the trading
limits, if vi(st+1) = 0 for agent i, we set the limits at the natural borrowing constraint,








and we redeﬁne the limit for these cases later. Further, if vi(st+1) > 0, we set Ai(st+1) =
ωi(st+1), implying that the borrowing limit is binding when the participation constraintTheoretical Economics 1 (2006) Enforcement constraints and intermediation 457
















































The ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that ωi(st)−Ai(st) is equal to zero if the




st+n|st Q(st+n|st)ci(st+n) ≥ 0




st+n|st Q(st+n|st)ci(st+n). The second inequality fol-
lows from the fact that ci(st) ≤
P
i ci(st). The third inequality follows from the deﬁni-
tion ofQ(st|s0) and the fact thatQ(st|s0)≥βtπ(st)u 0(ci(st))/u 0(ci(s0)) by construction.
Finally, the last equality follows form the high implied interest rate condition.
























Here, we have used the deﬁnitions of r(st) and p(st) and the fact that
P
i ai(st) =
[r(st) + (1 − δ)]K(st−1) and
P
















of degree 1 of the production function.
It remains only to redeﬁne the borrowing limits so that they are not too tight. To do
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Similarly, we can construct the value function W ce(ωi(st),Si(st)) and use the two
functionstoredeﬁnetheborrowingconstraintsforthenodeswherethelimitisnotbind-
ing. In particular, we can iterate on the constraint Ai(st) until we ﬁnd the one that sat-
isﬁes W ce(Ai(st),Si(st))=V ce(Si(st)). Since the new set of constraints is (weakly) tighter
than before, the new value of ωi −Ai still satisﬁes the transversality condition. Further,
since, these constraints do not bind for any household for whom the participation con-
straint is not binding in the planner’s solution, the allocation derived above with the
original constraints is still feasible and optimal. 
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